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1 Introduction
On July 31, 2007, the General Council of the World Trade Organization (WTO) set December 31, 2015
as the final deadline for the elimination of prohibited export subsidies in the Dominican Republic and 18
other developing countries that had previously been exempted from complying with the WTO disciplines
on subsidies.1 The majority of programs to be eliminated or reformed (if the prohibited export subsidy
component was removed) were fiscal incentives provided to firms operating in special economic zones (SEZ)
—geographically-bounded areas in which customs, tax and investment regulations are more liberal than in
the rest of the country (Farole and Akinci, 2011). Although SEZ are not forbidden by the WTO, they often
impose export share requirements (ESR) —i.e. firms located there are required to export at least a certain
share of their output to receive the subsidies provided by the SEZ regime (Defever and Rian˜o, 2017a). Doing
so makes the subsidies provided in SEZ contingent upon export performance, and therefore, prohibited under
the rules stipulated by the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM).
In this paper we investigate how the removal of ESR in the SEZ affected export performance at the
product- and firm-level in the Dominican Republic. To do so, we exploit the fact that the elimination of
ESR was carried out in a staggered fashion over time and across different industries. Before 2007, all firms
located in SEZ faced an 80% ESR. In the first wave of reform, Law 56-07, which was implemented in August
2007, eliminated ESR only for SEZ firms producing leather, textiles and apparel and footwear products
—the so called “national priority” sectors— while in June 2011, Law 139-11 lifted the ESR for all firms in
SEZ regardless of their sector of operation. Crucially for our purposes, both the timing and the selection of
sectors that experienced the removal of ESR first, were largely determined by external factors; namely, the
decision by the Dominican Republic to join the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in
2004, the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) in 2005 and, ultimately, the WTO deadline to comply
with the ASCM.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study how achieving compliance with WTO
disciplines on subsidies —specifically through the elimination of export requirements in SEZ— affects ex-
port performance at the microeconomic level. This is an issue of tremendous importance because SEZ are
ubiquitous across the world, account for a large share of exports in many countries and are one of the
most important tools of industrial policy in developing countries (Rodrik, 2004).2 Additionally, the inherent
1General Council decision of July 31, 2007 WT/L/691. The other beneficiaries of this extension were Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Uruguay (the so-called “Article 27.4 Coun-
tries” in reference to the article of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that establishes this exemption).
The notification also lists the subsidy programs that needed to be reformed. Section 3 explains in detail the reasons why these
countries were exempt from complying with the ASCM and describes the conditions that made them eligible to receive this
exemption.
2Boyenge (2007) reports the existence of 3,500 SEZ in 130 countries (more recently, The Economist (2015) puts this figure
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difficulty in defining and measuring export subsidies, combined with a lack of comparable data across coun-
tries and industries, has resulted in fewer empirical studies investigating them than any other instrument of
commercial policy (World Trade Organization, 2006).
Our empirical analysis is underpinned by a stylized model in which firms are heterogeneous in terms of
the demand they face for their product in the rest of the world. Given their type, firms choose whether to be
based in the SEZ or in the national customs territory. Locating in the SEZ involves paying a fixed registration
cost but provides firms with a subsidy that is conditioned on them exporting more than a share η P p0, 1s
of their sales. Firms in the national customs territory do not face a registration cost nor any restrictions on
their domestic sales, but do not receive any subsidy either. Firms’ location choice is determined by their
‘natural’ export intensity —the share of revenues that would have been accounted for by exports if they were
based in the national customs territory. Firms that would naturally export most of their output self-select
into the SEZ, whereas firms for which domestic demand is more important locate outside the zone. Firms
with a natural export intensity below the ESR threshold face a trade-off: operating in the SEZ lowers their
profitability because they need to distort their optimal mix of domestic sales and exports to satisfy the ESR,
but on the other hand, allows them to receive a subsidy.
We use our model to derive predictions regarding how the elimination of ESR in SEZ affects the number
of exporters based in SEZ and their export sales. As the distortion associated with the ESR is eliminated,
more firms find it profitable to operate in the SEZ. This effect operates both through the relocation of firms
from the national customs territory towards SEZ but also through entry of new firms. The effect of the
reform on exports originating from SEZ is ambiguous, however, because firm-level export responses differ
along the distribution of natural export intensity. On the one hand, firms that enter the SEZ increase their
exports because they are now subsidized. On the other hand, firms that were already based in the SEZ
—and which found the ESR binding— lower their exports in response to the policy change. Unconstrained
SEZ exporters —those that would have operated at an export intensity greater than the ESR even without
incentives— and firms that remain in the national customs territory are not affected by the reform.
We use customs transactions data for the period 2006-2014 to verify the predictions obtained from our
model. We find that within narrowly-defined products (HS 6-digit), the removal of ESR had a positive and
significant effect on the share of firms exporting from SEZ, whereas we do not find a significant change in
the share of export value originating from the zones. At the firm level, we find a positive and significant
effect of the reforms on export entry (extensive margin), defined both at firm- and firm-product-level for
firms located in SEZ, while for firms in the national customs territory we observe the opposite response. At
the intensive margin, we find a significant reduction in the value of export shipments for firms that remained
at 4,300 SEZ), accounting for approximately US$ 200 billion worth of exports.
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in SEZ —which suggests that a substantial number of these producers found the ESR constraint binding.
We also investigate if a tariff reduction for key inputs used in the production of priority sectors led to higher
imports among firms in the national customs regime. This policy —which was implemented only in the first
wave reforms in 2007— had the objective of leveling the playing field between firms across locations. Despite
its intentions, our results show that this tariff liberalization was largely ineffective.
Our main conclusion following from our analysis is that lifting the ESR in SEZ —while maintaining
the subsidies offered there— made SEZ more attractive locations to export from, but without significantly
increasing the value of export originating from SEZ or from the country as a whole.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains how our paper relates to existing
literature. Section 3 summarizes the rules on subsidies established in the ASCM; it also describes the
regulations governing SEZ in the Dominican Republic and the changes introduced by Laws 56-07 and 139-
11, which eliminated ESR. Section 4 sketches our model and outlines predictions about how the elimination
of ESR affects export performance at the product and firm level. Section 5 presents our data and provides
descriptive statistics regarding export patterns in the Dominican Republic. Section 6 discusses our empirical
strategy and presents our results. Section 7 concludes and discusses the policy implications of our results.
2 Related Literature
Our paper lies at the intersection of two literatures that despite being closely related, rely on very different
methodological approaches. On the one hand, Rose (2004), Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Eicher and
Henn (2011), have explored whether belonging to the GATT/WTO (i.e. adopting all relevant legal provisions
incorporated in the different articles of the agreements) increases a country’s exports. Our paper contributes
to this literature by focusing specifically on the disciplines regarding export subsidies. On the other hand,
Bagwell and Staiger (2006), DeRemer (2013), and Lee (2016), study instead the normative consequences
of WTO subsidy rules from a theoretical standpoint. We complement this work by exploring the effect of
complying with WTO rules on subsidies from a positive —and empirical— perspective.
Export performance requirements and SEZ have been studied as second-best trade policy instruments that
can reduce the anti-export bias of a trade policy regime (Davidson et al., 1985; Rodrik, 1987; Hamada, 1974;
Devereux and Chen, 1995). More recently, Defever and Rian˜o (2015, 2017a) study the welfare consequences
of imposing ESR on subsidies using a quantitative model calibrated to the Chinese experience with this type
of policy. Our paper contributes to this literature by investigating how the elimination of ESR affect export
performance at the firm- and product-level. Moreover, the reforms undertaken by the Dominican Republic
offer two clear advantages relative to the case of China in terms of understanding the consequences of ESR.
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First, we can readily identify in the data the firms that are subject to a single ESR; in China, in contrast,
several and often overlapping policies are subject to different ESR thresholds. Second, the variation in the
elimination of ESR across sectors and over time allow us to identify their effect on export performance at
the microeconomic level. Our paper also contributes to the growing literature that investigates how special
economic zones affect export performance (Wang, 2013; Davies and Mazhikeyev, 2015; Yu¨cer and Siroe¨n,
2017).
The Dominican Republic stands at the heart of a long-standing debate on the role of SEZ as an industrial
policy to foster economic development (Volpe Martincus, 2010). One side argues that overreliance on SEZ has
led to the country’s specialization in unskilled labor production, which has in turn resulted in immiserizing
growth (Kaplinsky, 1993). The other side claims that SEZ have been very successful in promoting exports
without threatening local producers (Willmore, 1995). Our paper speaks to this discussion by evaluating
how policy efforts aimed at promoting a new kind of SEZ —one in which firms are not precluded from selling
domestically— affect exports, one of the key performance dimensions for SEZ.
3 Compliance with WTO Subsidy Disciplines in the Dominican
Republic
This section provides a brief summary of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(ASCM), and its definition of subsidy. It also describes both the incentives and requirements incorporated in
the Dominican SEZ regime at the beginning of our period of study and the reforms introduced by Laws 56-07
and 139-11 in 2007 and 2011 respectively, which made the regime compliant with the WTO rules on subsidies.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and Article 27.4. The ASCM came
into place in 1995 following the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations. It provides a precise
definition of subsidy and determines the contingencies under which specific practices are actionable —i.e.
the conditions under which a member country can use countervailing measures to offset injury caused by
subsidized imports (Sykes, 2005).3
A subsidy is defined as a financial contribution by a government or public body conferring a benefit to a
recipient. Examples include direct transfers of funds such as grants and loans, foregone government revenue
(fiscal incentives) and provision of goods other than infrastructure by the government.4 In order for a subsidy
to be subject to the disciplines of the ASCM, it must be considered “specific” —i.e. it has to be explicitly
3Actionable subsidies may be challenged if they cause adverse effects to a WTO member country. Adverse effects include
injury to a domestic industry, export displacement in third markets or “nullification” of market access gains (Hartigan, 1996).
4See Article 1.1 ASCM.
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limited to a subset of enterprises, either in terms of their industry or geographic location. The argument is
that this class of subsidies has the greatest potential to distort the allocation of resources within an economy
(Creskoff and Walkenhorst, 2009). Crucially, the ASCM establishes that subsidies contingent in law or in
fact on export performance, or those that are conditioned on local content requirements are prohibited.
Developing countries not covered by Annex VII of the ASCM5 had an eight-year period since the inception
of the agreement to phase out or reform prohibited export subsidies. Nevertheless, due to economic, financial
and development reasons, the Dominican Republic and the other countries listed in footnote 1 were allowed
to apply for an extension to certain subsidy programs subject to notification and prior approval requirements
under Article 27.4 of the ASCM.6 This extension was initially granted until December 2007 and was subject
to annual reviews. In July 2007, however, the WTO General Council approved a final, irrevocable exten-
sion through December 2013, with a final two-year phase-out period ending no later than December 31, 2015.
The SEZ Regime in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic is one of the world’s pioneers in
the use of SEZ with a program that has been in operation for more than 40 years (Burgaud and Farole, 2011).
Law 8-90 of January 1990 established the regulatory framework governing special economic zones (Zonas
Francas) in the Dominican Republic. The objectives of SEZ are to attract local and foreign investment,
provide training, and encourage the transfer of technology and know-how in order to create employment,
particularly in deprived areas such as the border with Haiti.
Law 8-90 establishes a generous array of fiscal incentives to firms located in SEZ. These include duty-free
access to imported inputs and capital goods, and a 15-year (20 years for firms located in border zones), 100%
exemption of registration, construction, corporate income, gross sales and value-added taxes. The World
Bank (2014) estimates that the value of tax breaks offered to SEZ companies in 2014 stands at approximately
540 million US Dollars, or 0.9% of the Dominican Republic’s GDP —a substantial cost in terms of foregone
government revenue.
Firms located in Dominican SEZ were subject to an 80% export share requirement.7 This made the SEZ
regime a prohibited subsidy under the ASCM because the incentives described above were contingent on
export performance. Firms located outside SEZ and exporting through the national customs regime, on the
other hand, were not subject to any performance obligations regarding their export behavior.
Until 2007 the ESR applied equally to all firms in SEZ regardless of their sector of operation, as can be
5Countries designated by the United Nations as least-developed or those with GNP per capita below US$ 1,000 per annum
are exempted from the disciplines of the ASCM under the principle of special but differential treatment.
6See Document G/SCM/40, 17 January 2002, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The conditions were
that these countries could not account for more than 0.1% of the world’s export trade, had a gross national income lower than
US$ 20 billion in 2000, and that their subsidy programs had to have come into existence before 2001.
7Additionally, the sales made by SEZ firms in the Dominican customs territory were subject to the corresponding MFN
import tariff.
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seen in the first row of Table 1. Law 56-07, which was signed in May 2007 and started being implemented in
August 27, 2007, amended Law 8-90 and declared the leather, textiles and apparel and footwear, “national
priority” sectors. The second and fifth rows of Table 1 summarize the changes brought about by Law 56-07
for SEZ and non-SEZ firms in priority and non-priority sectors. SEZ firms in priority sectors saw the full
removal of ESR, which meant that they could now sell all their output in the Dominican Republic; moreover,
these domestic sales were not subject to import duties. Priority-sector firms located outside SEZ received
tax concessions similar to those available to their SEZ counterparts and enjoyed duty-free access to 126 HS
6-digit key imported inputs.
The 2007 reform maintained the 80% ESR for SEZ firms producing non-priority goods but offered them
duty-free access to the domestic market —provided that either the good in question was not produced in
the Dominican Republic, or, that it incorporated at least 25% of locally-sourced intermediate inputs in value
terms. The incentives available to SEZ firms in priority and non-priority sectors did not change with this
reform. Firms located outside SEZ producing non-priority goods were also not directly affected by Law
56-07.
Law 139-11 (implemented on June 24, 2011) completely eliminated the ESR for all SEZ firms regard-
less of their sector of operation, in accordance to the compromises signed under the CAFTA-DR free trade
agreement. SEZ firms in priority sectors retained their duty-free access to the Dominican market, whereas
their non-priority counterparts were required to pay the customary import tariffs. All SEZ firms are now
required to pay a 3.5% gross sales tax and 18% VAT on their domestic sales (see row 3 of Table 1), while
non-SEZ firms were not affected by this reform.
Timing of the Reforms. Although the need to make the SEZ regime compliant with ASCM disciplines
was clear since 1995, there is suggestive evidence that the timing and implementation of the removal of ESR
in the Dominican Republic was largely unexpected and precipitated by external factors.
Since 1983, 92% of Dominican exports entered the U.S. duty-free, while the remaining exports faced
an average effective tariff of 1.1% under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (MEPyD, 2015). Following the
implementation of NAFTA in 1994, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua began
to negotiate with the U.S. to achieve a free trade agreement that would provide them with a similar level
of market access as that enjoyed by Mexico. However, the Dominican Republic only joined the negotiations
in 2004, a point in which all countries but Costa Rica had already reached a consensus about the general
terms of the agreement. This essentially limited its involvement to ratify what other countries had already
negotiated, including the complete elimination of performance requirements by 2010.8
8See Article 3.4 and the Dominican Republic schedule in Annex I of the CAFTA-DR free trade agreement.
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Thus, the removal of ESR for SEZ was underpinned by explicit deadlines determined by the Dominican
Republic’s external commitments with the CAFTA-DR free trade agreement and the WTO. The decision
to eliminate the ESR for priority sectors in 2007 was primarily a response to the dramatic loss of market
share that Dominican exporters experienced in the U.S. market following China’s accession to the WTO and
the end of the MFA agreement. Law 56-07 was also seen as a gradual first step forward towards achieving
compliance of the SEZ regime with the dispositions of CAFTA-DR and the ASCM.
Compliance with the ASCM after the Reforms. From the standpoint of compliance with WTO disci-
plines, the reforms implemented under Laws 56-07 and 139-11 eliminate the prohibited subsidy component
of the SEZ regime. Nevertheless, maintaining the fiscal incentives for firms in priority sectors regardless of
their location and for firms based in SEZ, makes these programs specific under the ASCM. Therefore, the
Dominican Republic can maintain these programs in their current form as long as no WTO member country
raises a complaint about them in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The SEZ regime
in its current form is also in line with the rules governing special regimes under CAFTA-DR.
Table 1: Changes in SEZ Regulations in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2014
Period National Priority Sectors Non-priority Sectors
2006-2007
2008-2011
ESR fully removed; duty-free access to 
domestic market
80% ESR remains; duty-free access on domestic 
sales if product is not produced in DR or has at 
least 25% of local input content
2012-2014
Domestic sales remain free of import duties but 
are subject to a 3.5% tax on gross sales and 
18% VAT
ESR fully removed; Domestic sales are subject to 
import duty, 3.5% tax on gross sales and 18% 
VAT
2006-2007
2008-2011
Duty-free access to 126 "priority" intermediate 
inputs; exemption of VAT (ITBIS)
No change
2012-2014
SE
Z 
fi
rm
s
N
o
n
-S
EZ
 f
ir
m
s
80% ESR; duty-free imports of intermediate inputs and capital goods; full exemption of gross 
sales, registration, construction, corporate income and value-added (ITBIS) tax for 15 years (20 
years for firms in border SEZ)
No ESR; subject to national customs regime
No change
Law 56-07 signed on May 4, 2007; started being implemented on August 27, 2007
Law 139-11 signed on June 24, 2011; started being implemented in the same date
Law 56-07 signed on May 4, 2007; started being implemented on August 27, 2007
Law 139-11 signed on June 24, 2011; started being implemented in the same date
Source: Law 56-07 (available in Spanish at https://www.dgii.gov.do/legislacion/leyesTributarias/Documents/56-07.pdf)
and Law 139-11 (available in Spanish at https://www.dgii.gov.do/legislacion/leyesTributarias/Documents/139-11.pdf).
National Priority sectors are leather goods (HS 2-digit codes 41-43), textiles and textile articles (HS 2-digit codes 50-63) and
footwear (HS 2-digit code 64). The legislation regulating the activity of SEZ before 2007 is given by Law 8-90 of January 1990
(available in Spanish at https://www.dgii.gov.do/legislacion/leyesTributarias/Documents/8-90.pdf).
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4 Theoretical Framework
To fix ideas, consider an industry populated by a continuum of firms each producing a unique differentiated
good ω. Firms produce using a linear technology in which one unit of labor (the only production input)
yields one unit of output. Since ours is a partial equilibrium analysis, we assume that the wage, and therefore
the marginal cost of all firms, is equal to 1.
Firms can sell their output in two markets, Home (H), which we consider to be the Dominican Republic,
and Foreign (F ), which represents the rest of the world. The demand functions faced by a firm selling good
ω are:
qHpωq  pHpωq
σ, and qF pωq  AF pωq  pF pωq
σ, (1)
where σ ¡ 1 is the elasticity of demand, and pipωq is the price charged by the firm in market i P tH,F u.
We differ from standard models of trade with heterogenous firms (e.g. Melitz, 2003) in that we assume
that firms are heterogeneous in terms of the relative appeal of their product in the foreign market —which
we denote by AF pωq— instead of productivity. The reason is that we want our model to produce a non-
degenerate distribution of export intensity in the most parsimonious way possible.9 This implies that some
firms will find the ESR constraint binding, while others naturally export most of their output even without
the imposition of an ESR. Besides this, there is ample empirical evidence showing that heterogeneity in firms’
demand across different markets is as important as differences in productivity to explain firm-level variation
in export sales (Eaton et al., 2011; Crozet et al., 2012; Munch and Nguyen, 2014; Defever and Rian˜o, 2017b).
As will become clear below, our assumption implies that firms in SEZ are larger —in terms of export value—
than their counterparts outside the zones, a feature that is consistent with what we observe in the data.
We assume that a competitive fringe of potential entrants draw their export appeal from a known dis-
tribution after paying an entry cost, fEpMq, which is an increasing and convex function of the mass of
firms, M , operating in the industry. This assumption implies that when expected profits increase, the higher
mass of operating firms drives up the cost of entry, for instance, because of congestion forces. This is a
reduced-form way of incorporating entry into the model that allows us to establish how the elimination of
ESR affects the mass of firms.10
Home firms can be based in one of two locations, the special economic zone (z) or the national customs
territory (n). Firms choose their location ` P tn, zu in order to maximize profits, after having observed the
9If firms differ only in terms of productivity, they would all have the same export intensity.
10In our simple model the mass of firms does not affect the level of competition in the industry, while in models of monopolistic
competition, the mass of firms affects expected profits through the price index. As we show below, the optimal prices for firms
located in SEZ which are constrained by the ESR are highly non-linear functions of the demand shifters. This prevents us from
characterizing analytically how the elimination of ESR affects entry. Defever and Rian˜o (2017a) calibrate a model of subsidies
subject to ESR in a monopolistically competitive environment that features heterogeneity in productivity and firms’ demand
across markets to investigate the general equilibrium implications of these subsidies.
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realization of their demand shifter abroad. We model the SEZ as a location that offers a sales subsidy, s,
which is a stand-in for the wide range of incentives offered in SEZ relative to the national customs regime,
subject to an export share requirement, η P p0, 1s —following Defever and Rian˜o (2017a). Firms that want
to locate there face a fixed cost, fz, which encompasses the administrative costs of the application (e.g.
obtaining approval from the Consejo Nacional de Zonas Francas de Exportacio´n, the public-private body
that regulates SEZ). Producers in the national customs territory, on the other hand, can sell as much as
they choose in the domestic market but do not receive any incentives. We assume that firms do not face any
costs of selling their output domestically or abroad, and therefore —given the demand functions specified
in (1)— all firms export some of their output. We now proceed to discuss the profit maximization problem
faced by firms in the national customs territory and SEZ.
National Customs Territory. The profit maximization problem for a firm located in the national customs
territory reads:
max
pHpωq,pF pωq
rpHpωq  1s pHpωq
σ   rAF pωqpF pωq  1s pF pωq
σ. (2)
It is straightforward to show that a firm based in this location charges the same price for its product in each
market, i.e. pnHpωq  p
n
F pωq 
σ
σ1 . Therefore, sales for firm ω in each market are given by:
rnHpωq 

σ  1
σ

σ1
, and rnF pωq  AF pωq  r
n
Hpωq. (3)
Export intensity —the share of total sales accounted for by exports— for firm ω is given by:
ηnpωq 
rnF pωq
rnHpωq   r
n
F pωq

AF pωq
1  AF pωq
. (4)
We refer to ηnpωq as firm ω’s “natural” export intensity —i.e. the export intensity that a firm would choose
if it were located in the national customs territory. Note that since there is a strictly increasing relationship
between the export demand shifter, AF pωq, and natural export intensity, η
npωq, we can write all firm-level
variables in terms of the latter. Thus, profit for a firm with export intensity ηn based in the national customs
territory is:
pinpηnq 
rnHpωq   r
n
F pωq
σ

κ
1  ηn
, (5)
where κ  pσ  1qσ1σσ ¡ 0 is a constant term.
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Special Economic Zone. The profit maximization problem of a firm located in the SEZ reads:
max
tpHpωq,pF pωqu
rp1   sqpHpωq  1s pHpωq
σ   rp1   sqpF pωq  1sAF pωqpF pωq
σ  fz (6)
s.t.:
AF pωqpF pωq
1σ
pHpωq1σ  AF pωqpF pωq1σ
¥ η, (7)
where (7) is the export share requirement constraint. We show in Appendix A.1, that this problem has two
solutions that depend on a firm’s natural export intensity. Firms with a natural export intensity at least
equal to the threshold η, are directly eligible to operate in the SEZ and receive the incentives available there.
Since these producers do not need to distort their export intensity to locate in the SEZ, we refer to them
as unconstrained SEZ exporters. Conversely, firms with natural export intensity strictly lower than η (i.e.
constrained SEZ exporters) have to change their allocation of sales across markets to satisfy the ESR. More
specifically, Defever and Rian˜o (2017a) show that they simultaneously reduce domestic sales and increase
exports in order to exactly reach the ESR threshold. Doing so lowers the before-subsidy profits for these
firms, because they cannot operate at their optimal export intensity. Nevertheless, for firms with a relatively
high natural export intensity, this profit loss is more than compensated by the subsidy they receive when
they locate in the SEZ.
Profits for a firm in the SEZ are given by:
piz
 
ηn, η


$''&''%
κp1   sqσΘ
 
ηn, η

 fz, if ηnpωq   η
p1   sqσpinpηnq  fz, otherwise,
(8)
where the firm-specific revenue shifter for constrained SEZ exporters, Θ
 
ηn, η

, is given by:
Θ
 
ηn, η


ηn 
1  η
 σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
σ1 . (9)
We now show that a firm’s location choice is determined by its natural export intensity and how generous
the incentives offered in the SEZ are. More precisely, we establish that:
Proposition 1 If the subsidy granted in SEZ is sufficiently high, then there exists a unique export intensity
cutoff, pη  s, η, fz P  0, η, implicitly defined by pin ppηq  piz  pη, η, such that:
• Firms with ηn P p0, pηq, locate in the national customs territory.
• Firms with ηn P rpη, 1q, locate in the SEZ. Among the latter, firms with natural export intensity ηn P
10
pη, η operate as constrained SEZ exporters, while firms with ηn P rη, 1q operate as unconstrained SEZ
exporters.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
We are interested in a situation in which the imposition of ESR induces some firms to alter their natural
export intensity in order to locate in the SEZ. Otherwise, the elimination of ESR in the SEZ would not
have any impact on the number of firms located in SEZ nor on export sales. Therefore, we assume that the
subsidy granted to firms in SEZ satisfies the condition established in Proposition 1, so that a subset of firms
based in the SEZ are constrained by the ESR.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 shows that the profit of constrained SEZ exporters increases with natural export
intensity. Thus, given a subsidy rate s, firms with natural export intensity below pη are better off foregoing
the subsidy and operating at their natural export intensity. It also follows that as the subsidy offered in the
SEZ increases, firms with lower natural export intensity would prefer to locate there. In terms of Figure 1,
this means that the export intensity cutoff pη shifts to the left in response to an increase in s. Conversely, a
higher fixed cost of setting up a firm in the SEZ increases pη.
Figure 1: Firm’s Location Choice
National customs territory
η̂(s, η, fz) η
Constrained SEZ exporters Unconstrained SEZ exporters
Natural export intensity, ηn
Special Economic Zone
Eliminating the Export Share Requirement in SEZ. Based on the characterization of firms’ produc-
tion and location choices described above, we now establish a set of predictions regarding the effect that
eliminating ESR in SEZ has on the number of exporters and export values.
Suppose that the initial ESR prevailing in SEZ is η
0
¡ 0, but a reform eliminates the requirement (i.e. sets
η
1
 0), while maintaining the subsidy available in the SEZ unchanged. This intervention makes locating in
the SEZ more attractive to firms with export intensity below the initial cutoff pη0, since by joining the zone
they now get to operate at their natural export intensity and receive the subsidy as well. The existence of a
fixed cost of operating in the SEZ, however, ensures that not all firms move to the SEZ. For firms with the
lowest export intensity, the subsidy windfall is not sufficient to compensate them for incurring the fixed cost
to locate in the zone. Thus, following the reform there is a new export intensity cutoff, pη1 P p0, pη0q, such
that firms with natural export intensity below pη1 export from the national customs territory, while firms
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with export intensity above pη1 operate from the SEZ. The two location cutoffs, pη0 and pη1, and the initial
ESR η
0
define four regions of natural export intensity that characterize a firm’s response, in terms of export
and profits, to the policy change:
(i) Firms with ηn P p0, pη1q operate in the national customs territory before and after the policy change.
(ii) Firms with ηn P rpη1, pη0q move from the national customs territory to the SEZ, where they operate as
unconstrained SEZ exporters after the reform.
(iii) Firms with ηn P
pη0, η0	 were constrained SEZ exporters initially but become unconstrained after the
the ESR is removed.
(iv) Firms with ηn P

η
0
, 1
	
are unconstrained SEZ exporters both before and after the policy change.
Therefore, the first prediction from our model is that removing the ESR from SEZ, while keeping the
subsidy constant, induces some of the existing firms initially based in the national customs territory to
relocate to the SEZ.
We now show that the removal of ESR also generates entry of new firms into the SEZ. First, note that
firms in groups (i) and (iv) are unaffected in terms of their production, location or profits by the elimination of
ESR. As we noted above, new SEZ firms (firms in group (ii)) operate at their natural export intensity —just
as they did when they were based outside the SEZ— but now receive a subsidy, which in turn induces them
to export more increasing their profits. Formerly constrained SEZ exporters also experience higher profits
following the reform, but unlike new SEZ firms, they achieve this by exporting less. Eliminating the ESR
allows these firms to operate at their natural export intensity which is lower than η
0
, the intensity imposed
by the export requirement. Profits for formerly constrained SEZ firms increase because the distortion in the
allocation of sales across markets disappears with the reform. Since profits for all firms either increase or
remain unchanged, it follows that the expected value of operating in the industry increases, thereby inducing
entry of new firms. Thus, our prediction regarding the effect of the elimination of ESR on the number of
exporters based in SEZ reads:
Prediction 1 Assuming that the SEZ subsidy is not too high, eliminating the ESR in SEZ, everything else
equal, increases entry into the industry and induces firms to relocate from the national customs territory to
the SEZ.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
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It is straightforward to determine how the removal of ESR affects export sales based on the response
of each of the four groups of firms identified above. As noted above, new SEZ exporters increase their
export sales because they maintain their natural export intensity but now receive the SEZ subsidy. Formerly
constrained SEZ exporters instead reorient their sales towards the domestic market after the ESR is removed.
The response of exports to the removal of ESR is illustrated by Figure 2. Thus, our model’s prediction
regarding the response of export values to the elimination of ESR, reads:
Prediction 2 Eliminating the ESR in SEZ, everything else equal, has an ambiguous effect on the share of
export value originating from SEZ. New SEZ exporters increase their exports while previously constrained
SEZ exporters reduce theirs. The exports of firms that remain in national customs territory after the reform
and those of originally unconstrained SEZ exporters do not change when the ESR is removed.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Figure 2: Effect of the Elimination of ESR on Export Sales
η
0η̂0η̂1
E
xp
or
ts
(r
F
)
Natural export intensity (ηn)
existing unconstrained
SEZ exporters do not
change their exports
previously constrained SEZ
exporters reduce their
exports
new SEZ exporters
increase their exports
firms that remain in the
national customs territory do
not change their exports
The figure depicts the profile of export sales as a function of natural export intensity,
before (solid line) and after (dashed line) the ESR η
0
P p0, 1s is removed. The natural
export intensity cutoffs that characterize entry into the SEZ before and after the policy
change are denoted pη0 and pη1 respectively.
13
5 Data
This section describes the data used in our empirical analysis and provides summary statistics on export
and import performance according to firms’ location (in the national customs territory or SEZ) and sector
of operation (priority and non-priority).
We utilize transaction-level customs data provided by the Dominican Republic Customs Agency (Di-
reccio´n General de Aduanas, DGA). The data contains all export and import transaction values by product
at the HS 6-digit level and by origin/destination for the period 2006-2014.11 The universe of firms consists
of 29,682 firms reporting at least one positive export transaction in at least one of 4,466 HS 6-digit products
during our period of analysis. Crucially for our purposes, the data identifies trade flows that originate or
reach firms located in SEZ.
SEZ are critical for aggregate trade flows in the Dominican Republic. They account for more than 60%
of the country’s exports and 15% of its exporters throughout our period of analysis.12 Although they are
less prominent in terms of imports (they account for 20% of total imports and 1.5% of importing firms),
this difference underscores their importance at the macroeconomic level —the foreign exchange earnings
generated by exports from firms in SEZ play a key role in enabling the imports required by the rest of the
economy.
We now consider the sectoral composition of exports. The importance of leather goods, textiles and
apparel and footwear —the national priority sectors— in the Dominican export basket has declined secularly
since 2000, both because of the erosion of trade preferences in the U.S. and the more intense competition by
low-wage producers at the regional and global level. Priority products account for one-fifth of total exports
—almost all of which originate from SEZ— throughout the period of study. In non-priority sectors, SEZ
firms account for approximately half of export value. Table 2 presents the top 10 HS 2-digit export sectors
over our sample period, as well as the number of exporting firms and the share of exports originating in
SEZ. For only one out of the ten sectors is the average share of SEZ exports below 40%, and in fact, for
seven of them, this share exceeds 90%. This shows that although the Dominican export basket has gradually
diversified over the last decade (World Bank, 2014), its main comparative advantage sectors are still highly
reliant on SEZ.
11Transaction quantities, which would allow us to construct unit values are, unfortunately, only available from 2012 onwards.
12Schrank (2008) reports that the share of total exports accounted for by SEZ exceeded 80% in the first half of the 2000s.
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Table 2: Top-10 Export Sectors, 2006-2014
HS 2-digit Sector Export # % Exported
Value Firms from SEZ
Optical and medical instruments 690.33 368.00 96
Precious metals and jewelry 615.27 390.22 42
Electrical machinery and equipment 539.83 492.11 94
Iron and steel 526.37 150.22 5
Tobacco 450.96 233.56 95
Apparel and clothing 396.13 336.67 99
Plastics 263.41 591.33 61
Cotton 263.32 88.56 99
Knitted goods 251.70 266.22 99
Footwear 225.77 114.67 98
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Export and
import transaction values are denominated in millions of US dollars. Figures are averaged across
the period 2006-2014. Shaded rows indicate priority sectors.
Tables 3 and 4 shift the focus from aggregate to firm-level export and import performance, comparing
firms in SEZ with those located in the national customs territory. Firms located in SEZ are larger, export
and import more products, and sell to more markets and acquire inputs from a larger number of countries
than non-SEZ firms. SEZ firms also exhibit lower turnover rates in foreign markets. These figures are in line
with those reported by Fernandes et al. (2016) for countries at a similar stage of development.13
Table 3: Export and Import Performance by Firm’s Location
Special Economic Zones National Customs Territory
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Transaction value per firm Mean 44.98 54.05 5.62 3.32
Median 0.27 4.99 0.05 0.04
Products per firm Mean 6.38 46.32 4.03 9.91
Median 1.00 20.00 1.00 2.00
Destinations/origins per firm Mean 2.58 4.82 1.61 1.47
Median 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Export and import transaction values
are denominated in hundreds of thousands US dollars. Figures are averaged across the period 2006-2014.
13Median exports per firm across all locations in the Dominican Republic (averaged across our sample period) are 61,800
US dollars, while median exports per firm (averaged across all developing countries) in Fernandes et al. (2016)) are 63,000 US
dollars. The mean firm-level entry and exit rates for the group of developing countries reported by Fernandes et al. are 38%
and 37% respectively.
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Table 4: Average Export Entry and Exit Rates for Firms by Location
Firm Firm-HS-6 product
% Entry % Exit % Entry % Exit
Special Economic Zones 11.83 14.32 54.3 54.10
National Customs Territory 35.60 32.40 72.56 68.75
All locations 29.82 27.57 68.12 64.83
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Entry
measures the percentage of firms observed conducting an export transaction for the first
time in our data after 2006. Figures for entry are averaged across HS 6-digit products
and years over the period 2007-2014. Exit measures the percentage of firms that stop
exporting for the last time before 2014. Figures for exit are averaged across HS 6-digit
products and over the period 2006-2013.
A crucial difference between the two waves of SEZ reform was that Law 56-07 provided duty-free access
for 126 key inputs used in the production of priority products, whereas Law 139-11 did not include a similar
concession. This tariff liberalization only affected firms in the national customs territory because firms in
SEZ were already able to import inputs without paying tariffs. Table 5 presents the top 10 HS 6-digit
products (in terms of import value) whose import tariffs were set to zero, along with their share of import
value destined to SEZ and the percentage of imports purchased by firms exporting priority products located
outside SEZ. The table suggests that the tariff reductions mandated by Law 56-07 were likely to have a
minor impact on firms outside SEZ in priority sectors, since the most important inputs liberalized were
almost exclusively imported by SEZ firms. Moreover, the last column shows that most of the value of
imported products purchased by non-SEZ firms (with the exception of ammonium sulphate) is accounted
for by firms exporting non-priority products.
Table 5: Top 10 HS 6-digit “Priority Input” Imports
HS 6-digit Product HS6 code Import % SEZ % of non-SEZ
Value Imports Imports used in
Priority Sectors
White spirit 271011 1437.24 1 4
Plastic articles nes 392690 278.8 90 2
Soles and heels for footwear of rubber or plastic 640620 22.71 96 2
Bovine leather, vegetable pre-tanned 410411 18.1 99 0
Cartons, boxes & cases, of corrugated paper 481910 16.12 78 2
Other bovine leather, vegetable pre-tanned 410449 14.26 98 1
Footwear uppers and parts thereof, except stiffeners 640610 12.64 99 0
Ammonium sulphate 310221 12.4 0 52
Pigments and preparations based on titanium dioxide 320611 11.63 2 15
Cotton sewing thread for retail 520420 11.56 99 1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on customs transaction data from the DGA. Import values are denominated in millions
of US dollars. Figures are averaged across the period 2006-2014. Shaded rows indicate HS 6-digit products that are primarily
imported by non-SEZ firms.
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6 Empirical Analysis and Results
Identification Strategy. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that ESR were eliminated in SEZ
at different points in time for different sectors —namely, August 2007 for products belonging to the leather,
textiles and apparel, and footwear industries, and June 2011 for all other products. Since both reforms were
carried out in the second half of the year, we assume, for the purposes of constructing our main variable of
interest, that the elimination of ESR took place in 2008 for priority sectors and 2012 for all other products
in our benchmark specification, which is estimated using yearly data.14 Nevertheless, we also estimate all
our regressions aggregating the data at a biannual frequency. In the latter, the start periods for the two
waves of reform are identified as the second semester of 2007 and 2011 respectively. The results, which are
reported Appendix C, show that the conclusions from our benchmark analysis are robust to this change in
the aggregation of the data.
As we discussed in Section 3, the choice of timing and sectors facing the removal of ESR was largely
driven by external factors that can be considered exogenous when assessing the effect of the elimination of
ESR on firm- and product-level exports. Therefore, we argue that the well-known endogeneity problem that
arises when estimating the effect of changes in trade policy on export performance (Trefler, 1993; Harrigan
and Barrows, 2009) is less likely to contaminate our estimates.15 Since the decision to eliminate ESR first
in priority sectors was a response to China’s accession to the WTO and the end of the MFA agreement, it
follows that controlling for the secular changes in the demand for Dominican exports should allay concerns
regarding endogeneity due to an omitted variable problem. The regression that is more susceptible to be
affected by an endogeneity problem —due potential lobby driving the choice of products to be liberalized—
is the one that evaluates the effect of the input tariff liberalization mandated by Law 56-07.
It is also important to remark that, since ESR were removed for all products at some point during our
period of study, there is no ‘control’ group of products or firm-product combinations that was unaffected by
the policy change —a necessary condition to utilize a difference-in-differences design. Instead, since we have
a panel of narrowly-defined products that were affected by the policy at different points in time, we identify
the effect of the reform by relying on within (product, product-location, firm or firm-product-location, de-
pending on the specification) variation in the outcome variable before and after the reform, controlling for
aggregate changes —captured by time and location-year fixed effects— and HS 2-digit-specific linear trends.
14We choose to do this because conversations with officials from the Dominican Customs Agency suggest that SEZ firms took
some time to adapt to the policy change, with only a handful of firms taking immediate advantage of the possibility of selling
more than 20% of their output domestically. Unfortunately, we cannot assess this claim directly because we lack information
on firms’ domestic sales.
15In the textbook example of endogenous protection, firms that face stronger import competition have the incentive to lobby
more intensively for higher tariffs.
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Did the elimination of ESR affect exports and the number of exporters? We first investigate if
the removal of ESR in SEZ affected the level of exports and the number of exporters at the product level.
We also use this first regression to explore the effect of adding progressively richer arrays of fixed effects in
our estimating regression. We aggregate our data at the HS 6-digit product level (j), location (either SEZ
or the national customs territory, indexed by `) and year (t) level, to estimate:
ln EXPj`t  βReformjt   θXj   δTt   Trendj˜t   εj`t. (10)
The dependent variable, ln EXPj`t, is either the log of the value of exports or the log of the number of firms
exporting product j originating from location ` in year t. Reformjt —our main variable of interest— is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when SEZ exporters of HS 6-digit product j are no longer subject to
ESR and 0 otherwise. More precisely,
Reformjt 
$''&''%
1 if rj P Priority and t ¥ 2008s or rj R Priority and t ¥ 2012s
0 Otherwise.
Priority products are those HS 6-digit products that belong to HS 2-digit sectors 41-43 (leather goods), 50-63
(textiles and apparel) and 64 (footwear). A caveat regarding the definition of Reformjt is in order. As Table
1 shows, the two waves of reform involved the elimination of ESR, but also different policy changes. For
instance, while the 2007 reform eliminated ESR for priority products and gave them full access to the domestic
market, the 2011 reform increased the taxes faced by SEZ firms on domestic sales. Nevertheless, estimating
our regressions with separate dummies for the two waves of reform leaves the results unchanged. The
remaining explanatory variables included in regression (10) are product-specific variables Xj (e.g. whether a
given HS-6 product is a priority product or not), time-specific variables, Tt, that account for the timing of the
reforms, and Trendj˜t, which denotes a linear trend specific to HS 2-digit sector j˜, that seeks to account for
differences in the secular behavior of exports across broadly-defined industries. Standard errors are clustered
at the HS 6-digit product level.
Table 6 reports the results of estimating this set of regressions. The dependent variable in regressions
(1) to (4) is the log of export value, while in regressions (5) to (8) the dependent variable is the log of
the number of exporters. Before focusing our attention on the Reformjt variable, we first discuss the other
explanatory variables reported in columns (1) and (5), and how they are gradually replaced by fixed effects
in the regressions presented in columns (2)-(4) and (6)-(8).
The variable Priorityj takes the value 1 if product j belongs to a priority sector, and zero otherwise; this
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variable captures the importance of leather goods, textiles and apparel and footwear in the export basket
of the Dominican Republic and is replaced by a full set of HS 6-digit product and product-location fixed
effects in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8). The estimates presented in columns (1) and (4) reveal that exports
of priority products, which constituted the cornerstone of the Dominican export basket over the last four
decades, are more important —both in terms of value and number of exporters— than those of non-priority
products.
Post08t and Post12t are dummies that turn on after each wave of reform (2008 and 2012 respectively)
absorbing aggregate shocks affecting Dominican exporters in the aftermath of the removal of ESR, and are
replaced by year fixed effects in columns (2) and (6). Lastly, the variables ‘Linear trend priorityj˜t’ and
‘Linear trend non-priorityj˜t’ are linear trends specific to priority and non-priority sectors respectively; these
are replaced by HS 2-digit-specific linear trends in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8), which intend to control
for time-varying shifts in the world’s demand and supply of a given sector. The coefficients of the the
priority/non-priority sector-specific trends show a significant recomposition of the Dominican export mix
throughout our period of study. On the one hand, there is a marked secular decline in the export value and
number of exporters of priority sectors, while the non-priority sector as a whole —which includes primary
products like gold, rum and cigars as well as more sophisticated goods such as medical instruments and
electric machinery— exhibits the opposite pattern.
Focusing now on the coefficient associated with Reformjt, shows that the elimination of ESR in SEZ did
not have a significant effect on export value at the product level in any of our specifications (columns (1)
to (3)). The number of exporters per product, on the other hand, increased significantly after the removal
of ESR. The results in our most stringent specification in column (7) indicate that the reform of SEZ is
associated with an 18 percent increase in the number of exporters vis-a`-vis the sectoral trend.
In our last set of regressions, reported in columns (4) and (8) of Table 6, we decompose the effect of
the ESR reform on export outcomes according to the location from which exports originate —i.e. special
economic zones or the national customs territory. These regressions include HS 2-digit trends as well as
year-location and HS 6-digit-location fixed effects which control for differential effects of aggregate shocks
and time-invariant product characteristics across the two locations. Similarly to our previous results, we do
not find any significant impact of the elimination of ESR on export values in either location. The results
reported in column (8) show that the positive impact of the elimination of ESR in terms of the number of
exporters is fully concentrated in the SEZ.
Did the Elimination of ESR Affect the Importance of Exports Originating from SEZ? Promoting
exports by means of SEZ can be a costly strategy both from a fiscal and efficiency standpoint. We now move
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to investigate the effect that lifting the ESR had on the shares of export value and exporters originating
from SEZ across products.
Our model delivers two predictions regarding the effect that the elimination of ESR would have on the
importance of exports originating from SEZ. Prediction 1 states that the share of exporters based in SEZ
should univocally increase following a reform that relaxes the export requirement imposed in SEZ, given
that the incentives provided to firms located in the zones do not change. This rise can happen both because
firms in the national customs territory relocate to SEZ, or due to entry of new firms. Prediction 2 instead
shows that the effect of the reform on the share of export value accounted for by SEZ is ambiguous. Firms
that join the SEZ increase their exports as they become subsidized, while previously constrained exporters
relocate their sales away from the foreign market.
We aggregate the data at the HS 6-digit product and year level and estimate the following regression by
OLS:
ShareExpSEZjt  β0Reformjt   fj   ft   Trendj˜t   εjt. (11)
The dependent variable, ShareExpSEZjt, is either the share of export value originating from SEZ, or the
share of the number of exporters based in SEZ for a given product j in year t (columns (1) and (3) of Table
7 respectively). As in the previous set of regressions, Reformjt is our key variable of interest, capturing the
impact of the elimination of ESR. We also investigate if the two waves of reform had differential effects on the
importance of exports from SEZ. To do so, we split Reformjt into its two components: Priorityj  Post08t
and Non-Priorityj  Post12t, which capture the effect of Law 56-07 and Law 139-11 respectively. Thus, the
regressions reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table 7 are:
ShareExpSEZjt  β1
 
Priorityj  Post08t

 β2
 
Non-Priorityj  Post12t

 fj ft Trendj˜t εjt. (11’)
Both specifications include HS 6-digit product (fj) and year (ft) fixed effects, which control for time-invariant
characteristics that affect the attractiveness of exporting a product from SEZ and aggregate shocks. Tj˜t
denotes a set of HS 2-digit linear trends that absorb broad, time-varying secular factors at the sectoral level
that determine the attractiveness of SEZ as an export location. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
HS 6-digit product level.
Table 7 presents our estimates of regressions (11) and (11’). Column (1) shows a positive but only
marginally significant effect of the ESR reform on the share of export value originating from SEZ, although
this effect dissipates when we examine the two waves of reform separately in column (2). The results
presented in column (3), however, strongly confirm Prediction 1. The share of firms exporting a given
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HS 6-digit product from SEZ increases by 6.2 percentage points on average relative to the situation prior
to the reform. As we noted before, the increase in the share of firms exporting from SEZ can be due to
relocation from existing firms or entry of de-novo firms into the SEZ. The data suggests that the latter is
the dominant effect, since there are, on average, 4.47 new firms for every existing firm relocating to SEZ.
The estimates presented in column (4) show a slightly stronger impact of the reform on products in priority
sectors —although the two coefficients are not significantly different from each other. Our results suggest
that extending the incentives available in SEZ to firms in the national customs territory in priority sectors
—the main feature distinguishing the two waves of reform— was largely ineffective. We provide further
evidence of this interpretation below when we investigate if firms outside SEZ increased their imports after
the tariff liberalization of key priority inputs mandated by Law 56-07. Overall, the results reported in Table
7 indicate that opening the domestic market to firms located in SEZ has fostered the consolidation of the
special economic zones as a cornerstone of Dominican exports.
Table 7: Share of SEZ in Export Value and Number of Exporters at the HS 6-digit Product-level
Share Export Value Share Number of Exporters
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Reformjt 0.036* 0.062***
(0.020) (0.015)
Priorityj  Post08t 0.033 0.070***
(0.027) (0.022)
Non-priorityj  Post12t 0.039 0.054**
(0.035) (0.029)
Year FE X X X X
HS-6 FE X X X X
HS-2 linear trends X X X X
Observations 19,141 19,141 19,141 19,141
R2 0.669 0.669 0.669 0.669
Robust standard errors clustered at the HS 6-digit product level. ***, significant at the 1% level; **,
significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
Firm-Level Effects. Having investigated the impact of the elimination of ESR on exports at the product
level, we now focus on its consequences at the firm-level. We first examine how within-firm export sales —i.e.
the intensive margin of exports— were affected by the reform. Prediction 2 suggests that exports of firms
that remained in the SEZ should either fall —if they were constrained by the ESR— or remain unchanged,
while the exports of firms outside SEZ should not be affected.
Intensive margin. In order to evaluate the effects of the reform on the intensive margin of firms’ exports, we
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aggregate our data at the firm-product-location-year level, and estimate the following regression by OLS:
ln Intensiveij`t  β0Reformjt   fij   ft   Trendj˜t   εij`t. (12)
The dependent variable is the log of export sales by firm i exporting HS 6-digit product j from location `
in year t. As in our previous regressions, we include year fixed effects and HS 2-digit specific linear trends
to control for aggregate and sectoral shocks, while the use of firm-product (fij) fixed effects, in turn, means
that we rely on changes in a firm’s exports of the same product over time to identify the effect of the
reform. Standard errors are, once again, clustered at the HS 6-digit product level. When we investigate the
differential effect of the reform on firms’ exports in SEZ and the national customs territory (non-SEZ`), our
estimating equation then becomes:
ln Intensiveij`t  β1 pReformjt  SEZ`q   β2 pReformjt  non-SEZ`q   fij`   f`t   Trendj˜t   εij`t. (12’)
Notice that since we include firm-product-location and location-year fixed effects in (12’), we identify the
impact of the reform on firms that export the same product from the same location.
The estimates of regression (12) —which are presented in column (1) of Table 8— show that the reform
in SEZ is associated with a significant reduction in firm-level export sales. Decomposing the overall effect
by location in column (2), reveals that there is a large, negative and significant response of the intensive
margin of exports for firms located in SEZ —exports of a given product for firms that remain in SEZ fall by
20% ( 1  expp0.227q) on average following the removal of ESR. Conversely, the reform did not have a
significant impact on exporters based in the national customs territory. These two results are consistent with
our theoretical framework. The strongly negative response of the intensive margin observed among firms
based in SEZ suggests that a substantial number of them were constrained by the export share requirement.
Extensive margin. The estimating equations we use to evaluate the response of the extensive margin are as
follow:
Extensiveij`t  β0Reformjt   β1Priorityj   ft   Trendj˜t   εij`t, (13)
and,
Extensiveij`t  β1 pReformjt  SEZ`q   β2 pReformjt  non-SEZ`q
  β3
 
Priorityj  SEZ`

  β4
 
Priorityj  non-SEZ`

  f`t   Trendj˜t   εij`t. (13’)
23
Once again, our specifications include HS-2 specific linear trends and standard-errors are clustered at the
HS 6-digit level. Since the model’s predictions are framed in terms of entry, we focus on this dimension of
the extensive margin.16 We define the extensive margin at the firm-HS 6-digit product (columns (3)-(6)) as
well as at the firm level (columns (7)-(10)), as a robustness check for our results. More precisely, entry is a
dummy that takes the value 1 when either a firm or firm-product combination appears for the first time in
our export data.17
Specification (13) includes time fixed-effects but also a priority product dummy to control for time-
invariant differences between products that experienced the reform at different points in time. Similarly,
regression (13’) has both location-year fixed effects and a product’s priority status dummy in each of our
two locations. We provide estimates using a linear probability model (columns (3)-(4) and (6)-(7)) and a
probit model. The two set of estimates produce qualitatively similar results.18 In so doing, we estimate the
probability of observing a new firm or firm/product exporting product j from location ` at time t for the first
time. Within a given location, these new firms can either be existing firms relocating from the other location
(national customs territory or the SEZ) or completely new firms that choose to produce from location `.
The results reported in columns (3)-(10) of Table 8 show that the removal of ESR had a positive impact on
export entry relative to the broad sectoral trends during our period of study. The aggregate effect, however,
masks important differences among firms depending on their location. Consistent with Prediction 1, we
find that the positive effect on entry following the lifting of ESR is only observed among firms in SEZ. The
estimates reported in columns (4) and (8) imply that exports of new firm-product combinations increase by
4.8 percentage points relative to sectoral trends, while entry of new exporters rises by 2.2 percentage points
in SEZ following the reform.
We find that export entry fell among firms in the national customs territory, although this effect is only
significant in one case (column (6)). Our model’s prediction about the response of the number of new firms
outside SEZ to the elimination of ESR is ambiguous. On the one hand, the fall in the export intensity
cutoff implies that firms relocate towards the SEZ. On the other hand, the higher expected profitability
that follows from the removal of ESR should foster entry in both locations. The results regarding the exit
margin (see regression B.1), although less precisely estimated, paint a similar picture —the probability that
a firm-product combination stops being exported falls for firms located in SEZ, while increasing for firms in
the national customs territory.
16Nevertheless, we also report an analogous set of regressions with exit as the dependent variable in Appendix B.
17Our conclusions remain unchanged if we instead define entry as taking the value 1 when a firm or firm-product combination
has a positive value of exports in year t but not the year before.
18We also estimate linear probability models that incorporate HS 6-digit product fixed effects instead of the priority product
dummy. Similarly, priority product dummies in each location are replaced by HS 6-digit product-location fixed effects. These
estimates are quite similar to those reported in Table 8 and are available upon request.
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Did the input tariff liberalization of 2007 help Non-SEZ firms in priority sectors? A key difference
between the 2007 and 2011 reforms was that the former extended some of the incentives available in SEZ to
firms exporting priority products from the national customs territory. In our last exercise we investigate if
the tariff cuts for key inputs in the production of priority products mandated by Law 56-07 increased the
imports of these products among firms outside SEZ. To this end, we estimate the following regression by
OLS:
ShareImpSEZjt  β0pPost08t  Priority Inputjq   fj   ft   Trendj˜t   εjt. (14)
The dependent variable is either the share of imports —in terms of value or the number of importing firms—
accounted for by SEZ of HS 6-digit product j in year t. Priority Inputj takes the value 1 if imports of
product j were made duty-free by Law 56-07 and 0 otherwise. Notice that since Law 139-11 did not extend
any import tariff reductions, equation (14) does not include an interaction term for liberalized inputs after
2012.
As we discussed in Section 5, the most important goods for which tariffs were liberalized, were either
imported almost exclusively by firms in SEZ, or were general-purpose inputs imported by a large number
of firms in priority and non-priority sectors alike. With this in mind, we also explore whether the response
to the tariff reduction depends on the importance of a product as an input in the production of priority
goods. Ideally we would rely on an input-output table to categorize products as specific to priority sectors
or general-purpose inputs, but unfortunately these data are not available for the Dominican Republic for
our period of study. Instead we pursue the following alternative strategy: we classify each of the 126 HS
6-digit products liberalized as specific to priority sectors if the first two digits of their product nomenclature
correspond to those of a priority product. For instance, the HS 6-digit product ‘bovine leather’ is classified
as a priority product because its first two digits correspond to the leather goods sector. ‘White spirit’, which
is also a priority input, is instead considered a non-priority product. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 present
estimates of the following OLS regression that modifies equation (14):
ShareImpSEZjt  β1pPost08t  Priority Inputj  Priority Productjq 
β2pPost08t  Priority Inputj  Non-Priority Productjq   fj   ft   Trendj˜t   εjt. (14’)
Column (1) of Table 9 shows an insignificant reduction in the share of liberalized inputs imported by SEZ
firms after 2008; similarly, column (2) reveals an insignificant change in the share of SEZ firms importing
these goods. Column (3), however, shows a marginally significant reduction in the share of imports destined
to SEZ for products that are not specific to firms operating in the leather, textiles and apparel and footwear
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industries. If —as the results in Table 9 imply— firms in the national customs regime did not receive a
sufficient boost in incentives after the removal of ESR, tougher competition from SEZ firms in the domestic
market could have also contributed to the increase in the share of exporters based in SEZ after the elimination
of ESR.
Table 9: Share of SEZ in Import Value and Number of Firms at the HS 6-digit Product-level
Import Value # Firms Import Value # Firms
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Post08t  Priority inputj -0.033 -0.004
(0.021) (0.015)
Post08t  Priority inputj  Priorityj -0.019 0.034
(0.043) (0.036)
Post08t  Priority inputj  Non-Priorityj -0.040* -0.022
(0.022) (0.013)
Year FE X X X X
HS-6 FE X X X X
HS-2 linear trends X X X X
Observations 40,770 40,770 40,770 40,770
R2 0.018 0.029 0.018 0.029
Robust standard errors clustered at the HS 6-digit product level. ***, significant at the 1% level; **, significant at
the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
7 Conclusions and Policy Implications
For more than four decades the Dominican Republic has relied extensively on providing generous fiscal
incentives in special economic zones to promote exports. A central feature of this policy was the imposition
of an export share requirement, which made the subsidies provided in SEZ contingent on export performance,
and therefore, prohibited under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In this paper we
exploit the staggered removal of ESR across products and over time to evaluate how making SEZ compliant
with WTO disciplines affected export performance at the product- and firm-level.
Our results are consistent with a model in which the use of ESR induces a subset of firms to alter their
optimal export intensity in order to be able to locate in SEZ and enjoy the subsidies available there. We
find that the removal of ESR had a positive effect on export entry and in the share of exporters located in
SEZ within narrowly-defined products. On the other hand, we do not find any significant effect on export
sales nor on the share of export value originating from SEZ. At the firm-level intensive margin, however, we
find that exporters in SEZ lowered the value of their export shipments after the reform —which suggests
that a significant number of them found the ESR constraint binding. The main takeaway message from
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our analysis is that eliminating the ESR made the SEZ a more desirable location for firms to be based in,
thereby reinforcing the central role of played by SEZ in the Dominican Republic.
Although our analysis has focused on the response of exports to the removal of ESR at the microeconomic
level, it is clear that the SEZ reform had important macroeconomic implications for the Dominican Republic.
On the one hand, our results suggest that the already substantial fiscal cost of the SEZ regime is likely to
have increased after the reform, without having achievied a significant increase in aggregate exports. On the
other hand, the general equilibrium analysis of Defever and Rian˜o (2017a) shows that removing the ESR
distortion has the potential to deliver substantial welfare gains —particularly if a large number of firms were
constrained by the export requirement— as our results suggest. It is also possible that fostering entry of
local firms into SEZ could also boost the diffusion of knowledge spillovers originating from large exporters
based in the zones. Further research is necessary to determine which of these effects is ultimately stronger,
and whether SEZ can contribute to the industrial strategy of the Dominican Republic and other developing
countries while at the same time adhering to the rules of the world trade system.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Profit Function in the Special Economic Zone
Defever and Rian˜o (2017a, Proposition 1) show that the ESR constraint (7) is only binding for firms with
ηn   η. Thus, unconstrained SEZ exporters —i.e. firms with ηn ¥ η— solve the unconstrained maximization
problem (6) by choosing optimal prices:
pz,uH pωq  p
z,u
F pωq 
1
1   s

σ
σ  1
. (A.1)
Plugging these back into the profit function (6) and replacing AF pωq 
ηn
1ηn , yields the optimal profit for
unconstrained SEZ exporters:
piz,upηnq 
κp1   sqσ
1  ηn
 fz  p1   sqσpinpηnq  fz. (A.2)
When ηn   η, then the ESR constraint (7) holds with equality. This implies that constrained SEZ exporters
solve the problem:
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where we have, again, substituted AF pωq 
ηn
1ηn and the ESR constraint, pH 

1η
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the profit function (6).
Taking the first-order condition of (A.3) with respect to pF and substituting this in the ESR constraint
yields optimal prices for constrained SEZ exporters:
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1
1   s

σ
σ   1


p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1  p1  ηnq
1
σ1
p1  ηq
1
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1
ﬀ
, (A.4)
pz,cF 
1
1   s

σ
σ   1


p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
η
1
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
ﬀ
. (A.5)
Plugging (A.5) into (A.3) and re-arranging, yields:
piz,c
 
ηn, η



ηn
1  ηn



1   s
η
 ppz,cF q
1σ
 fz. (A.6)
Further substitution of (A.5) into (A.6) results in
piz,c
 
ηn, η

 κp1   sqσ
 ηn 
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 σ
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σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
	σ1
ﬁﬃﬂ
looooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Θpηn,ηq
fz. (A.7)
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and therefore,
piz
 
ηn, η


#
κp1   sqσΘ
 
ηn, η

 fz, if ηnpωq   η
p1   sqσpinpηnq  fz, otherwise.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Since we cannot explicitly solve for the level of natural export intensity pηpsq that solves pin ppηpsqq 
piz
 pηpsq, η, we show that pin pηnq and piz  ηn, η intersect once in the interval p0, ηq. To do so, we need
to verify that four conditions hold:
(i) pinp0q ¡ piz,cp0, ηq.
(ii) pinpηq   piz,cpη, ηq.
(iii) dpinpηnq{dηn ¡ 0 and dpiz,cpηn, ηq{dηn ¡ 0.
(iv) dpinpηnq{dηn   dpiz,cpηn, ηq{dηn when ηn   η.
(i) is straightforward: pinp0q  κ ¡ piz,cp0, ηq  fz.
(ii) If,
s ¡

1  
fzp1  ηq
κ
 1
σ
 1, (A.8)
then, pinpηq   piz,cpη, ηq  piz,upηq  κp1 sq
σ
1η  f
z.
(iii) dpi
npηnq
dηn 
κ
p1ηnq2 ¡ 0. Since
dpiz,cpηn,ηq
dηn  κp1   sq
σ 
BΘpηn,ηq
Bηn , we first need to calculate the latter
derivative. Some algebra reveals that,
BΘ
 
ηn, η

Bηn

η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
2σ
σ1 
1  η
 σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
σ ¡ 0. (A.9)
(iv) We now show that
BΘpηn,ηq
Bηn ¡
1
p1ηnq2 , which implies that
dpinpηnq
dηn  
dpiz,cpηn,ηq
dηn when η
n   η:
η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
2σ
σ1 
1  η
 σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
σ ¡ 1p1  ηnq2
η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
σ
σ1 ¡

p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
σ
η
1
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1 ¡ p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1

1  η
η


¡ p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1
η
1
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1 ¡ p1  ηq
1
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1
1  ηn
ηn
¡
1  η
η
η ¡ ηn. (A.10)
Conditions (i)-(iv) imply that firms with natural export intensity ηn P p0, pηpsqq locate in the national
customs territory, while firms with natural export intensity greater than pηpsq locate in the SEZ. Among the
latter, those with a natural export intensity below η are constrained SEZ exporters, and those with natural
export intensity at least equal to the ESR threshold are unconstrained SEZ exporters.
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A.3 Proof of Prediction 1
Recall that pη is implicitly defined by pinppηq  piz,cppη, ηq. We can express this indifference condition in more
detail as follows:
Fppη, ηq  κ
1  pη  κp1   sqσΘppη, ηq   fz  0. (A.11)
We can then use the implicit function theorem in (A.11) to determine the sign of dpηdη :
dpη
dη

κp1   sqσ
BΘpηn,ηq
Bη

ηnpη
dpinpηnq
dηn

ηnpη
 κp1   sqσ
BΘpηn,ηq
Bηn

ηnpη
ﬀ . (A.12)
We have shown in Proposition 1 above that the term in square brackets in the denominator is negative when
evaluated at ηn  pη (recall that pη P p0, ηq). Therefore, we now only need to sign the derivative BΘpηn,ηqBη in
the numerator to determine the sign of (A.12):
BΘpηn, ηq
Bη

σηn
p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
σ pηnq 1σ1 p1  ηq 1σ1   p1  ηnq 1σ1 η 1σ1	 . (A.13)
Since the term in parenthesis is strictly positive whenever ηn   η, it follows that
BΘpηn,ηq
Bη   0, and therefore,
that dpηdη ¡ 0. This means that when the ESR threshold falls, the export intensity cutoff to join the SEZ falls
and more firms choose to locate there. In other words, if we let pη0 denote the initial natural export intensity
cutoff to enter the SEZ (i.e. when η ¡ 0) and pη1 the cutoff when locating in the SEZ is not subject to an
ESR, we have shown that pη0 ¡ pη1.
Notice that when η  0, pizpηn, 0q  piz,upηnq for all ηn P p0, 1q. We can now find the natural export
intensity cutoff, pη1, that determines entry into the SEZ when there is no ESR explicitly:
κp1   sqσ
1  pη1  fz  11  pη1 , (A.14)
which yields pη1  1  κfz pp1   sqσ  1q.
To ensure that not all firms locate in the SEZ once the ESR is lifted, we require that the subsidy granted
in SEZ is not too large. More specifically,
s  

1  
fz
κ

 1
σ
 1. (A.15)
Effect on the Mass of Operating Firms. Having determined the conditions under which pη1 ¡ 0, we can
identify four types of firms following the removal of ESR:
(i) Firms with ηn P p0, pη1q operate in the national customs territory before and after the policy change.
There is no change in their exports nor in their profits.
(ii) Firms with ηn P rpη1, pη0q move from the national customs territory to the SEZ, where they operate as
unconstrained SEZ exporters.
(iii) Firms with ηn P
pη0, η0	 were constrained SEZ exporters initially but become unconstrained after the
reform.
(iv) Firms with ηn P

η
0
, 1
	
remain unconstrained SEZ exporters after the ESR is eliminated, and therefore
do not change their exports nor their profits.
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We now show that the profits of firms in groups (ii) and (iii) increase after the removal of the ESR. As
noted above, the profits for firms of type (i) and (iv) are not affected by the policy change.
Profits for firms that move to the SEZ increase because they get to operate at the same natural export
intensity as the did when they were located in the national customs territory but now receive the subsidy s.
Similarly, firms that remain in the SEZ but that stop being constrained by the ESR also see their profits
increase. This follows from the fact that the value of the revenue shifter Θ
 
ηn, η

is never greater than 11ηn ,
the revenue shifter of a firm operating at its natural export intensity, ηn.
Since the profits of firms in the industry either increase or remain unchanged relative to the situation
where η
0
¡ 0, it follows that:
E

pi0 pηnq


»
pη0
0
pin pηnq dGpηnq  
» η
0
pη0
piz,c
 
ηn, η

dGpηnq  
» 1
η
0
piz,u pηnq dGpηnq  
»
pη1
0
pin pηnq dGpηnq  
» 1
pη1
piz,u pηnq dGpηnq  E

pi1 pηnq

,
where E

pik pηnq

denotes the expected profit of operating in the industry when ESR η
k
is in place, and
dG pηnq is the pdf of natural export intensity, which can be obtained from the pdf of firms’ product appeal
in the foreign market by means of the method of transformations for random variables.
Since the free-entry condition reads E rpi pηnqs  fEpMq, it follows that E

pi0 pηnq

  E

pi1 pηnq

implies
that M0   M1, given that fE is an increasing function of the mass of firms. This shows that the mass of
operating firms in the industry increases when ESR are removed.
A.4 Proof of Prediction 2
Export sales (after subsidy) are given by:
rnF  AF pp
n
F q
1σ
 σκ

ηn
1  ηn


(A.16)
rz,uF  p1   sqAF pp
z,u
F q
1σ
 σκp1   sqσ

ηn
1  ηn


(A.17)
rz,cF  p1   sqAF pp
z,c
F q
1σ
 σκp1   sqσ

η  Θpηn, ηq

. (A.18)
(i) Firms with ηn P p0, pη1q operate in the national customs territory before and after the policy change.
There is no change in their exports.
(ii) Firms with ηn P rpη1, pη0q move from the national customs territory to the SEZ, where they operate as
unconstrained SEZ exporters. Therefore,
rbeforeF
rafterF

rnF
rz,uF

1
p1   sqσ
  1. (A.19)
Therefore export revenue for this firms increase after the ESR is eliminated.
(iii) Firms with ηn P rpη1, ηq were constrained SEZ exporters initially but become unconstrained after the
reform.
rbeforeF
rafterF

rz,cF
rz,uF

η  Θpηn, ηq
ηn
1ηn
	 ¡ 1. (A.20)
This means that firms that were located in the SEZ and that were constrained in their allocation of
sales by the ESR decrease their exports in response to the policy change.
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We now verify that indeed (A.20) is greater than 1 when ηn   η:
η  ηn 
1  η
 σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
σ1 ¡ ηn1  ηn
η
1
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1 ¡ p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1   η
σ
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1
η
1
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1 p1  ηq ¡ p1  ηq
σ
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1
η
1
σ1 p1  ηnq
1
σ1 ¡ p1  ηq
1
σ1 pηnq
1
σ1
1  ηn
ηn
¡
1  η
η
η ¡ ηn.
(iv) Firms with ηn P rη, 1q remain unconstrained SEZ exporters after the ESR is eliminated, and therefore
do not change their exports.
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B Exit
In this appendix, we report a set of regressions regarding export exit. We define the extensive margin both at
the firm-HS-6 product (columns (1)-(4)) and firm level (columns (5)-(8)) as a robustness check for our results.
More precisely, exit is a dummy that takes the value 1 when either a firm or firm-product combination is
observed exporting for the last time in our data. Our estimating equations are,
Extensiveij`t  β0Reformjt   β1Priorityj   ft   Trendj˜t   εij`t, (B.1)
and,
Extensiveij`t  β1 pReformjt  SEZ`q   β2 pReformjt  non-SEZ`q
  β3
 
Priorityj  SEZ`

  β4
 
Priorityj  non-SEZ`

  f`t   Trendj˜t   εij`t. (B.1’)
We also estimate the effect of the reform on exit by means of a linear probability model and a probit
estimator. Analogously to the case of entry in the main text, our estimations include either a priority product
dummy to control for time-invariant differences between products that experienced the elimination of ESR
at different points in time (columns (1), (3), (5) and (7)) or a product’s priority status in each of our two
locations (SEZ and national customs territory) are also used in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8).
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C Estimates using Semester Data
In this appendix we re-estimate the regressions presented in the main body of the paper using data aggregated
at a biannual frequency. The reform dummy that turns on when exporters of HS 6-digit product j experience
the removal of ESR in SEZ is defined as follows:
Reformjt 
#
1 if rj P Priority and t ¥ 2007.S2s or rj R Priority and t ¥ 2011.S2s
0 Otherwise.
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Table C.2: Share of SEZ in Export Value and Number of Firms at the HS 6-digit Product-level
Share Export Value Share Number of Exporters
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Reformjt 0.024 0.046***
(0.017) (0.014)
Priorityj  post08t 0.013 0.051***
(0.021) (0.017)
Non-priorityj  post12t 0.035 0.039
(0.030) (0.026)
Year FE X X X X
HS-6 FE X X X X
HS-2 linear trends X X X X
Observations 32,968 32,968 32,968 32,968
R2 0.634 0.634 0.631 0.631
Robust standard errors clustered at the HS 6-digit product level. ***, significant at the 1% level; **,
significant at the 5% level; *, significant at the 10% level.
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